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Annulment m
the Conflict of Laws
In this Article Professor Storke analyzes the concept of "an-
nulment" and the rules which govern invalidation of the
marital status in interstate proceedings. He suggests that
legislation is needed to clarify existing rules of service of
process, jurisdiction and res judicata, and that the choice
of law rule that the place of celebration controls validity
might better include express recognition of the interests of
the forum.
Frederic P. Storke *
MRs. JONES consulted her lawyer about her teen-age
daughter. "Sally has only been married a month," she said, "and
now she wants a divorce."
"Wouldn't an annulment be better?" the lawyer inquired.
"What's the difference?"
"A divorce terminates a valid marriage," said the lawyer. "An
annulment establishes that the parties were never legally married."
"But they were married," said Mrs. Jones. "Married in church,
and everybody knows it. Besides, they have been sleeping together.
Isn't an annulment something that people get when they have never
slept together?"'
"Not necessarily. In this state a girl who marries before she is
eighteen can have the marriage annulled any time before her nine-
teenth birthday, regardless of consummation." 2
"For all I know," Mrs. Jones objected, "Sally may be pregnant.
If she is, I don't want people going around saying she has never
been married."
"Why not wait until we know?" the lawyer suggested. "If she is
pregnant, we will get her a divorce. If not, we will go for an an-
nulment."
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. There is some basis for this notion. Courts are more reluctant to grant an an-
nulment after the marriage has been consummated. See Svenson v. Svenson, 178
N.Y. 54, 70 N.E. 120 (1904); Lewine v. Lewine, 170 Misc. 120, 9 N.Y.S.2d 869
(Sup. Ct. 1938). See also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845
(1912), distinguishing a New Jersey case cited on the ground that the marriage
there had been consummated.
2. E.g., CoLo. Emrv. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1 (Supp. 1957); cf. N.Y. Dom. REX. Law
§ 7-1.
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I. THE DEFINITION OF ANNULMENT
With woman's intuition, Mrs. Jones had put her finger on a flaw
in the lawyer's statement. How can the courts say that a marriage
never took place when it clearly had occurred? Part of the difficulty
stems from an ambiguity in the definition of annulment. The word
covers two distinct proceedings which are often confused, and
which will be called "declaratory annulment" and "avoidance an-
nulment."
The two types of annulment are related to the existence of two
types of defective marriages. A "void marriage" exists when there
is a defect so basic as to make it socially desirable to give no legal
operation to the ceremony.3 An example is where two persons are
ceremonially married when one of them is already married to an-
other spouse. Less serious defects make the marriage "voidable."
Such a marriage can be set aside by legal proceedings, but if it is
never judicially avoided, all the legal consequences of a valid mar-
riage follow. For example, if one of the parties has practiced fraud
or duress on the other, the latter may have the marriage annulled.
The distinction between a legal proceeding to have a marriage
declared void and one to have a voidable marriage set aside has
been pointed out4 but has often been ignored or slighted in the
cases. The function of the first type of proceeding is obviously
declaratory, hence the term "declaratory annulment' used here to
describe it. The same result can be obtained by the use of an ordi-
nary declaratory judgment5 although resort to this procedure is rare.
The second type is "constitutive" 6 in the civil law phrase; that is,
it produces important changes in existing legal relationships. The
avoidance of the marriage is usually optional with one of the parties,
although there are cases where either party can secure the annul-
ment, as for example (in some states) where both spouses are under
eighteen.7
No terms exist which are in general use to describe the two types.
The New York statute8 speaks of an action "to procure a judgment
declaring the nullity of a void marriage or annulling a voidable mar-
riage," and the Colorado statute' employs somewhat similar phrases.
3. 2 ScHOLER, MARRIAGE, DiVORCE, SEPARATION AND DomESTIc RELATIONS §
1081 (6th ed. 1921).
4. McMurray & Cunningham, Jurisdiction To Pronounce Null a Marriage Cele-
brated in Another State or Foreign Countn, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 105 (1930); see
N.Y. Cry. PRhc. AcT § 1132; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46 (Supp. 1957).
5. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929), at suit of lawful
spouse.
6. See MeMurray & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 112.
7. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46---1 (Supp. 1957).
8. N.Y. Cry. PRAc. AcT § 1132.
9. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-3--4 (Supp. 1957).
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The distinction can be more briefly expressed by the terms used in
this article. The statutes restrict the word "annulment" to avoidance
annulment, which would be unobjectionable if it were not for the
fact that lawyers have been accustomed to use the term to desig-
nate declaratory annulment.
When a single word is used to describe two different things, its
definition should reflect this by the use of an alternative. The cor-
rect definition of annulment is that it is a legal proceeding used
to avoid a voidable marriage or to declare a void marriage invalid.
H. EFFECr OF ANNuLMENT-RELATON BACK
If we recognize the distinction between declaratory and avoid-
ance annulment what are we to say about the operation of the
decree in each case? It is quite obvious that a decree of declaratory
annulment theoretically wipes the slate clean: it is as if the par-
ties had never married. Children of the void marriage are illegiti-
mate. The spouses have no property rights in each other's estates.
If either spouse marries again, this later marriage is valid and the
children of the new union legitimate. A decree of avoidance an-
nulment might be supposed to operate differently, treating the mar-
riage as good until annulled and having the same legal operation
as a perfectly valid marriage terminated by divorce. The courts
have held otherwise, ruling that the decree operates exactly like a
decree of declaratory annulment reaching back and destroying all
legal consequences which would have resulted from the voidable
marriage if it had never been annulled.10 The practice of the Eng-
lish ecclesiastical courts, which did not draw any distinction be-
tween void and voidable marriages," and the analogy of an ordi-
nary contract which is judicially avoided,12 probably contributed
to this result However, the sweeping dogma that there is no dif-
ference between the operation of the two decrees has been under-
mind by recent cases which will be discussed later.
Does this rule of relation back apply to a marriage which by
statute is declared "void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction"?' It is possible to look at the
decree envisaged by such an enactment as the equivalent of a de-
cree of divorce, treating the voidable marriage as a valid union
until avoided. The lower courts in New York tended to take this
view, but in In re Moncriefs Will" the law was settled other-
10. 2 ScHouLR, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1081; Note, 43 HAIv. L. RE%-. 109 (1929).
11. Note, 43 HAny. L. REV. 109 (1929).
12. The contract analogy is stressed in In re Moncriefs Will, 235 N.Y. 390, 139
N.E. 550 (1923).
13. N.Y. Dom. REL. L. w § 7.
14. 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923).
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wise and the doctrine of relation back was applied. The result was
to bastardize a girl who was born illegitimate and legitimitized by
the subsequent marriage of her parents, a marriage later annulled
for duress. The experience of Agnes Ga Nun in this case recalls
that of England's Virgin Queen, conceived out of wedlock, legiti-
mitized by one annulment and bastardized by another.",
Although the retrospective effect of annulment is bard on chil-
dren, it has been very beneficial to another class of claimants:
widows and divorcees who have forfeited their rights to continuing
payments by a remarriage which is annulled later. These persons
may plausibly assert that they have never "remarried" within the
meaning of the law so that their right to the payments is reinstated
by the annulment. Among the claims affected are alimony, separa-
tion payments, insurance and social security benefits, workmen's
compensation and pensions. Sometimes, but not always, the courts
hold that the rights are revived. Regardless of the social desirability
of these holdings, they represent a trend which lawyers cannot
afford to overlook. If a woman who has remarried is considering
a divorce or an annulment, the latter may be advisable if it is
legally possible whenever she is involved in any of these situations.
The important cases involving some of these conflicts problems
will be discussed later.
III. TnE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION
It is generally agreed that presence of the defendant in the forum
is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings.
These proceedings differ from ordinary transitory actions 0 in that
there must be some additional contact point with the forum. Domi-
cile of the husband or wife, residence of either, place of celebration
of the marriage, or place where the violation of marital duty oc-
curred have all been relied on in the divorce cases, and all of these
except the last may plausibly be advanced as jurisdictional bases
in annulment.
There is a lack of authority as to the sufficiency of residence
short of domicile. If the current controversy about its sufficiency
in the divorce cases' 7 ends in approval of this basis by the Supreme
15. Henry's marriage to Ann Boleyn took place when he was supposedly married
to Catherine of Aragon. The annulment of Catherine's marriage retroactively vali-
dated Ann's, so that Elizabeth was born legitimate while her sister Mary became
illegitimate. The subsequent annulment of Ann's marriage bastardized Elizabeth. The
succession of both princesses to the throne was made possible by an act of Parlia-
ment, but this act id not in terms legitimatize them. See Elizabeth, Ann Boleyn in
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITRANICA (11th ed. 1911).
16. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS §§ 78 (as to ordinary transitory actions),
110 (as to divorce), 115 (as to annulment) (1934); see Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
17. Denying jurisdiction, Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955)
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Court, we may expect cases in which it is urged as a sufficient con-
tact point in annulment A recent case in England' 8 sustains juris-
diction under these circumstances, although it should be remem-
bered that residence plays a more important jurisdictional role in
that country than in the United States.
The main controversy is between the state of domicile and the
state of celebration. Should jurisdiction be exclusively in one state
or concurrent in both? (Concurrent in three states if the spouses
have separate domiciles.) This writer prefers concurrent jurisdic-
tion, and this is the solution adopted in a recent Colorado statute."9
Nearly all states recognize domiciliary jurisdiction " but authority
for concurrent jurisdiction is more limited.
In the United States, the ease with which domicile may be
changed may account for the paucity of cases in which the fact
that the marriage took place in the forum is relied on as the sole
contact point It is different in England, where a wife cannot ac-
quire a separate domicile and the courts are not so ready to find a
change of domicile by the husband as they are here. The English
cases are not at all consistent, but the most recent decision 2' sup-
ports this basis of jurisdiction. A commentator 2 2 believes that the
English law is now settled and the earlier cases overruled.
A generation ago an acute controversy broke out on this matter,
precipitated by the Restatemen's proposal that jurisdiction should
be limited solely to the state of celebration.' This view is sur-
prising when we consider that it was opposed to nearly all of the
cases.' 4 The arguments for it are mainly doctrinal and derive from
the now discredited vested rights theory, which holds that only the
state which "creates" a status can dissolve it Judge (then Professor)
Goodrich25 had previously taken this position, but there was a
strong counterblast from McMurray and Cunningham. -2 ' The Amer-
ican Law Institute then voted in favor of domiciliary jurisdiction, "
(holding limited to Virgin Islands); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
Upholding jurisdiction, Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace
v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 820 P.2d 1020 (1958); Crowvnover v. Crownover, 58 N.M.
597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
18. Ramsey-Fairfax v. Ramsey-Fairfax, [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. 188 (P.D.).
19. Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 129, § 4.
20. The cases are collected in Annot., 128 A.L.R. 61 (1940).
21. Addison v. Addison, [1955] No. Ire. L.R. 1 (Q.B.).
22. Webb, The Twilight of the Doctrine of Inverclyde v. Invertlyde, 4 L,r'L &
COMp. L.Q. 557 (1955), concluding that the English courts have jurisdiction on the
basis of either domicile or place of celebration, and probably of residence.
23. RB_srATAEm , CoNFrc-r or LAws §§ 121, 122 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1926).
24. See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 61 (1940).
25. Goodrich, Jurisdiction To Annul a Marriage, 32 H.nv. L. REv. 806 (1919).
26. McMurray & Cunningham, supra note 4.
27. R=ATEMENT, CoN;ucr OF LAws § 115 (1934), which states that thejurisdiction for both declaratory annulment (§ 115(1)) and avoidance annulment
(§ 115(2)) is the same as for divorce, covered in §§ 110-13.
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and since that time the matter has seldom been debated. The new
Restatement "takes no position as to whether the state of celebra-
tion should have concurrent jurisdiction."2 8
There is no good reason for denying jurisdiction to the state of
celebration. It has a reasonable contact with the marriage and is
sometimes a convenient forum. Its courts should have discretion to
refuse jurisdiction if convenience does not exist. Since the question
is an open one in many states, it would be wise to settle this matter
one way or the other by statute, as Colorado has done.29
Holdings by American courts that they have jurisdiction, or that
other state courts do not, are subject to review by the United States
Supreme Court under the due process8° and full faith and credit"1
clauses. To date no such ruling has ever been reviewed. In this
situation we have to accept the state decisions, tentatively, as
binding authority in particular jurisdictions. We get some insight
into the solution of the constitutional problem from one case com-
ing up from the lower federal courts.
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to pass on the juris-
dictional problem until 1952 in Sutton v. Leib, 2 which will be con-
sidered in detail later. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
state of the domicile to annul a marriage celebrated in another
state and ruled that a federal court sitting in a third state must
recognize the decree."3
Since this case, it is no longer possible to contend that the state
of the domicile of both parties lacks judicial jurisdiction, and it
seems plausible to assume that it will be sufficient if either spouse
is domiciled in the forum. The case leaves untouched the juris-
diction of the state of celebration, and it may be a long time before
this problem is finally settled.
IV. Tim METHOD OF SERVICE
When a sufficient basis of jurisdiction exists, there is a further
requirement that proper notice of the proceeding must be given
to the defendant.34 In actions for divorce, it is widely held that this
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 caveat (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1953), citing in support of the jurisdiction Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210
Ark. 186, 194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946); Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N.E.
638 (1912); Sawyer v. Slade, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929); McDade v.
McDade, 16 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). Contra, Antoine v. Antoine, 132
Miss. 442, 96 So. 305 (1923). See also Annot., 128 A.L.R. 76 (1940).
29. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
32. 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
33. This part of the holding is based on Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U.S. 66 (1939).
34. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 75, 100, 109 (1934).
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notice may be given by any of the usual forms of constructive serv-
ice, including service by publication.35 This is usually rationalized
by the theory that an action affecting a status is in rem and that
constructive service is always valid in this class of proceedings."'
However, courts have had difficulty in seeing any "res" in the an-
nulment cases, and there are holdings that this action is in per-
sonam and requires personal jurisdiction over the defendant, nor-
mally obtained by personal service within the forum.37 In declara-
tory annulment at least, the very statement of the plaintiff's case
negates the existence of any status.
The law of family relations is plagued by an excess of doctrinal
thinking. This legal method consists of taking certain general state-
ments as sweepingly true (usually without proof of their validity),
and then using them as major premises of syllogisms for the solu-
tion of new cases by deductive reasoning. A better approach is
found in the utilitarian (more exactly, social-utilitarian or soci-
ological) method, which distrusts all generalizations except for
tentative conclusions which are only valid if the practical results
conform to our sense of justice and social desirability.
Doctrinal thinking frequently produces unsound results, but
often the result is sound enough although based on unsatisfactory
reasoning. It is suspected that the judge may have based the actual
holding on practical considerations which he is reluctant to have
appear in his written opinion. This leads to a doctrinal statement
in which a good result is reconciled to an apparently conflicting
general principle by means of a fiction. The vice of all this is that
it obscures the real issues and sets a bad precedent for later de-
cisions which may take the fiction too literally.
In the field under discussion there are two generalizations which
cause trouble. One is that constructive service is proper for ac-
tions in rem but not for actions in personam. The other is that
marriage is a status. Either statement may be correct enough if
properly limited, but each contains seeds of difficulty.
We should start by realizing that the marital actions should
not be classified as either in rem or in personam, but sui generis.
The Restatement of Judgments correctly sets up a class of pro-
35. See 2 ScHoura, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 1521-23.
36. Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953). See discussion of
the in rein or in personam aspect in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-302 (1942) (opinion of the court), point-
ing out that there is no constitutional barrier to substituted service on a nonresident
defendant in a divorce action.
37. See discussion in 35 A. Ju. Marriage § 75 (1941). Cases refusing to allow
constructive service are collected in Annot., 128 A.L.R. 61, 73 (1940). At least two
states have permitted such service. Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 89 Cal. App.
2d 877, 202 P.2d 360 (1949); Piper v. Piper, 46 Wash. 671, 91 Pac. 189 (1907).
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ceedings with respect to status,38 but unfortunately places them
in a sub-class under proceedings in rem. Once we place them in
a separate class, we are freed from the illusion that rules for the
service of process must be analogous to those used in proceedings
against property or for purely personal claims. The Supreme Court
has indicated a growing reluctance to determine the validity of a
given type of service on the basis of the orthodox in rem or in per-
sonam distinction in certain types of legal proceedings," and it is
not at all hard to regard annulment as one of these types.
From a utilitarian standpoint, service by publication in a divorce
action can be justified in one situation and only one. This is where
the defendant has disappeared and cannot be located after a rea-
sonable search. Here the law must choose between two unsatis-
factory alternatives. Service by publication is hard on the absent
defendant, since it is unlikely that he will receive any real notice.
On the other hand, refusal of jurisdiction will be very unfair to the
plaintiff who is tied to a missing spouse. On balance, the plain-
tffs case is stronger. The defendant's difficulty is usually of his
own making and we need not treat a vanished husband with any
more consideration than we do an absentee property owner.
Unfortunately, if we rationalize this result by calling divorce
an action in rem, we appear to justify service by publication in the
more common case of a nonresident spouse whose address is known.
Here we should resort to the rule that a method of service which
has a minimal tendency to reach the defendant should not be per-
mitted when a better method is available,4 and require service
by registered mail or personal service outside of the state.
The analogous problem in annulment should not be attacked by
the doctrinal classification of the action, but by asking whether
the practical situation in the latter is so different as to call for a
different rule. It is hard to see any important differences between
the two, particularly between divorce and avoidance annulment.
Each of these presupposes a "binding" marriage, that is, a party
who remarries without a judicial decree dissolving the union is
guilty of bigamy. One may theoretically do so if the marriage is
"'void" but only by risking a bigamy prosecution in case of a wrong
conclusion about the validity of the marriage. It is not a good policy
for the law to leave a spouse in this uncertain predicament.
Further, even if annulment is regarded as a proceeding in per-
sonam, this does not necessarily rule out all forms of constructive
service. The notion that process cannot run across state lines in
personal actions was given its death-blow in McGee v. International
38. REsrATEMENT, JuDGmENTs § 38 (1942).
39. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
40. Ibid.
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Life Ins. Co. 1 The present approach is that if there are sufficient
contacts with the forum, it may exercise jurisdiction in personam
over nonresidents if reasonable notice of the proceeding is given to
them.
The conclusion is that legislatures may and should provide for
some form of constructive service in annulment actions, and allow
service by publication upon court order, which should only be
made when the judge is satisfied that the defendant cannot be lo-
cated after a reasonable search.
Legislative dissatisfaction with the usual doctrinal approach is
indicated by the developments in Colorado. In Owen v. Owen""
the court ruled that domicile of the husband was a sufficient basis
of jurisdiction, although the wife was domiciled in Texas and the
marriage celebrated there. However, following the majority rule
and approving the in personam theory, the court held that personal
service in Texas was insufficient to give personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
Four years later the legislature passed a new statute which at-
tempted a complete revision of the law of annulment. The doc-
trinal difficulty was circumvented by the creation of a "determin-
able marriage status."43 On this basis the statute allows service
of process in accordance with the rules of civil procedure for other
actions in rem affecting a specific status.&"
While the new law reaches the desired result, there are certain
objections to its method of approach. It perpetuates the notion that
divorce and annulment should be classified as in rem or in person-
am. It justifies the in rem classification of annulment by a fiction
which may not even work. The courts might say that where no
status exists, the legislature cannot create one. Finally, it is too
liberal in allowing service by publication when a nonresident de-
fendant can be located.4 5
V. THn DEcpE AS RFs JuDIcATA
When two or more states have concurrent jurisdiction with re-
spect to a certain matter, the question of which one will ultimately
decide the controversy naturally arises. Each state claims the
right to determine the marital status of its domiciliaries, 4 but we
41. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
42. 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1958).
43. Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 129, § 4.
44. Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 129, § 5.
45. The statute must be read in connection with CoLO. P. Civ. P. 4(g), (h).
The rule requires a showing that personal service cannot be had within the state,
but does not require efforts to locate nonresident defendants.
46. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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cannot permit conflicting determinations where the husband is
domiciled in one state and the wife in another. The answer, of
course, is that the first judgment will prevail under the principle
of res judicata and must be given full faith and credit in every
other American state. This may produce a race of diligence. If one
spouse affrms and the other denies the validity of the marriage,
a race might ensue to get an annulment decree on record before
a declaratory judgment is entered in another state establishing the
validity of the marriage.
For an illustration suppose H, a New York resident, secures a
Nevada divorce from W-1 and marries W-2, also a New York resi-
dent, in Nevada. Returning to New York he is faced simultaneously
with a support action by W-1 and an annulment suit by W-2.17
Acting fast, he changes his domicile to Connecticut 48 and brings a
declaratory judgment action against both wives in that state and
is lucky enough to secure personal service on them in the forum.
It is quite possible that the Connecticut court, applying Nevada
law, will affirm the validity of the Nevada divorce and marriage.
If this judgment is entered before the New York actions have pro-
ceeded to judgment,49 the latter state must give full faith and credit
to the judgment. It is now too late for W-1 to contend that she
is H's wife or for W-2 to contend that she is not. The judgment,
however, does not necessarily destroy W-1's right to support." The
practical result is that New York has lost its power to determine
the marital status of the two wives who reside there.
Assuming that the central issue of the existence of the marriage
is conclusively determined by the annulment decree or declara-
tory judgment, how about the other matters which may fall within
the broad scope of res judicata? Does it decide all of the legal rela-
tions of the alleged spouses? Does it operate as collateral estoppel
with respect to the issues involved? How far does it affect the legal
relations of third parties to the spouses?
If we continued to regard the marriage status as a single and
47. The facts so far are taken from Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952). The
rest are hypothetical.
48. Did he need to do so? There is no requirement in the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act nor in the Connecticut statute that one of the spouses must be
domiciled in the forum when a determination of status is sought. The courts, how-
ever, might say that this is one of the marital actions and requires the same addi-
tional contact points as divorce and annulment.
49. It is immaterial which action was begun first. It is the judgment that counts.
Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1876-1877).
50. Suppose H asked for an adjudication that the Nevada divorce had ex-
tinguished his duty to support W-1? It would be erroneous for Connecticut to
grant this prayer, assuming that W-1 was not personally subject to the jurisdiction
of the Nevada court. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). However, if
the Connecticut court made such a declaration it would have the effect of res
judicata if no appellate proceedings were taken.
[Vol. 43 :849
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indivisible thing, we would conclude that an annulment cut off
any possibility that any of the incidents of the status survived the
decree. We have been compelled, however, to recognize the divisi-
bility of the marriage status and the divisibility of divorce. A court
which lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse may
have the power to sever the marital bond, but it cannot impose a
personal duty to pay alimony,51 nor cut off the right of support, 52
nor determine the custody of children.53
Is there a similar problem in annulment? Not in the majority of
courts, since they will not entertain annulment suits unless person-
al jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained.54 In the growing
minority that put jurisdiction for annulment on the same basis as
jurisdiction for divorce,55 the same problem may come up and
should receive the same solution.
Between the original parties, a decree of annulment operates
by way of collateral estoppel as well as bar. Neither spouse can
re-litigate any of the issues of law or fact in any other proceeding
in which they may become involved with the other spouse."
The effect of annulment on the rights and duties of third per-
sons is not so easy to state. The Restatement, treating judgments
in status proceedings as a division of actions in rem, lays down an
almost identical rule for the two. Just as the judgment as to the
ownership of property in a true57 action in rem is binding on "the
whole world," so the determination of the existence or nonexist-
ence of a status binds everyone. And just as the findings on issues
of law or fact in the action in rem are conclusive only on the parties
who have actually litigated these matters, so such findings in status
proceedings do not operate as collateral estoppel on third persons
generally.58
Even those courts which consider annulment an action in per-
sonam requiring personal service seem to have no difficulty in
accepting the rule that a determination of the existence of status
binds everyone. Once a decree is entered annulling a marriage, no
one can successfully contend in any legal proceeding that the mar-
riage still exists. Does it follow that no third person can ever base
a claim or defense on the fact that two parties may have gone
through a marriage ceremony which turns out to be nugatory? We
51. 2 ScHoouLmt, op. cit supra note 3, § 1762.
52. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
53. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
54. See note 37 supra.
55. See note 37 supra; cf. REsTATEmENT, CoNrmacr oF LAws § 115 (1934).
56. BEsTATEmENT, JurGEsmNTs § 74 (1942).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. But see Headen v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 252 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1958)
(effect of declaratory judgment establishing the validity of a marriage).
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should bear in mind the divisible nature of status and the possi-
bility that some of the incidents of a valid marriage may arise from
an abortive one and may even survive a decree of annulment. The
extent to which this is true will appear from a detailed analysis of
the cases that follow.
Let us now return to Sutton v. Leib.5" The thrice-married Mrs.
Sutton sued her ex-husband, the defendant Leib, in a federal court
in Illinois, for alimony alleged to have accrued between the dates
of her second and third marriages. Under her Illinois divorce de-
cree, Mrs. Sutton was entitled to alimony until she remarried. She
claimed that the second marriage to Walter Henzel did not count,
since it had been declared void by a New York court, so that Mr.
Leib's duty to pay alimony continued until her third and admit-
tedly valid marriage.
Mrs. Leib married Mr. Henzel in Nevada just after he had re-
ceived a divorce there from his first wife, Dorothy. He had been
a resident of New York but claimed that he had acquired a Nevada
domicile. The couple returned to New York where Dorothy sued
Mr. Henzel for separate maintenance. The court held that the
Nevada divorce was void for lack of a genuine domicile.00 Mrs.
Leib then sued for a declaratory annulment, which was granted,
and later married Mr. Sutton and brought the present action for
alimony.
The federal court had to decide whether Mrs. Leib had "remar-
ried" when she went through the Nevada ceremony. The lower
courts ruled that the Nevada marriage was valid in spite of the
New York decree of annulment. 1' The Supreme Court, however,
took the position that the New York decree was entitled to full
faith and credit and the marriage should be treated as void. The
questions of the jurisdiction of the Nevada divorce court 2 and the
validity of the Nevada marriage had become res judicata. The
judgment for Mr. Leib was therefore reversed.
The matter did not rest there. "Marriage status" is not an indi-
visible concept. It is a short term for a collection of rights, duties,
powers and privileges, some of which are central and vitally con-
nected with the very existence of the marriage, some secondary
and relatively unimportant, often involving the legal relationship
of third persons to one of the spouses. We can give the New York
decree the effect of res judicata without holding it to be determi-
59. 842 U.S. 402. (1952).
60. That a divorce decree may be attacked on this ground was established by
the second Williams case. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
61. Sutton v. Leib, 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951).
62. As to the three-state jurisdictional problem, the result follows from Treinics
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1989).
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native of these collateral matters. The duty of Mr. Leib to pay his
ex-wife alimony had never been adjudicated by the New York
courts and is not so vitally connected with the Henzel marriage
as to stand or fall with the existence of that status. If Illinois chooses
to say that Mrs. Leib lost her right to alimony when she went
through a marriage ceremony with Mr. Henzel, Illinois is free to
do so in spite of the New York decree.
Reasoning along these lines, the Supreme Court remanded the
case with instructions to the court of appeals to find out what effect
the Illinois law would give to the void ceremony. If his duty was
discharged by this state law, Mr. Leib would again win. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter thought the court should have required petitioner to
bring a declaratory judgment action in the Illinois courts to decide
this question, in view of the uncertainty of the holding in the Illi-
nois case most nearly in point.
On remand, the court of appeals(3 decided that Mr. Leib was
liable for the back alimony under Illinois law. Lehmann v. Leh-
mann 64 was distinguished on the ground that the marriage there
was merely voidable and imposed a duty of support until annulled,
while the Henzel marriage was void and imposed no such duty. The
writer seriously doubts that the Supreme Court of Illinois would
have taken this position if the matter had been submitted to them.
If the court of appeals is correct about Illinois law, an ex-wife
who secures a decree of declaratory annulment of a later marriage
is entitled to the alimony, but one who gets a decree of avoidance
annulment is not. This shows that there may be important differ-
ences between the two kinds of annulments, and points up the need
for distinguishing carefully between the two types.
In Lehmann v. Lehmann" the wife's right to alimony was per-
manently lost by her second and voidable marriage. It did not re-
vive when an Illinois court annulled the second marriage, which
had been contracted in New Jersey before the end of the year dur-
ing which Mrs. Lehmann was forbidden to marry by the Illinois
decree.
In New York the ex-wife may lose part but not all of her alimony
by a voidable marriage. In Sleicher v. Sleicher," the second mar-
riage was annulled for fraud. It was held that Mrs. Sleicher was
entitled to alimony from the date of the annulment decree, but not
for the intervening period. In this case the forum, New York, was
also the state of celebration of both marriages and the annulment
forum, but the claim for alimony was based on a Nevada divorce.
63. Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952).
64. 225 II. App. 513 (1922).
65. ibid.
66. 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929).
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The New York decree was one of avoidance annulment, not declara-
tory anmnlment, since the second marriage was not void but void-
able. However, a complication arose because of the New York
doctrine that avoidance annulment produces the same legal con-
sequences as declaratory annulment. It wipes the slate clean,
reaching back and destroying the voidable marriage from the be-
ginning. This would give Mrs. Sleicher a good argument for the
recovery of all of the back alimony. Mr. Justice Cardozo, admitting
that the rule was an established one, managed to evade it. The
whole doctrine, he said, was a fiction designed to promote justice,
and in this case it would be unjust to require Mr. Sleicher to pay
alimony for the period when his wife was being supported by an-
other man.
The rule of the Sleicher case was modified in Gaines v. Jacobsen,"7
in which the ex-wife was denied any further payments under a
separation agreement when her subsequent marriage was annulled
as void from its inception. The court thought that the passage of
Civil Practice Act 1140-a, giving power to award alimony in annul-
ment proceedings, made it unnecessary to give retroactive effect to
the decree of annulment so as to reinstate the wife's claim for sup-
port against the first husband. 8
How does Sutton v. Leib affect the very similar situation in Dodds
v. Pittsburgh, M. & B. Rys.?O9 Here Mrs. Dodds lost, not alimony,
but workmen's compensation payments as a result of her Mexican
marriage later annulled by a court of the domicile, California. By
Pennsylvania law, the ceremony was sufficient to cut off her widow's
rights, and Sutton v. Leib confirms the view that this law controlled.
The actual decision for the railway was therefore correct, but much
of the court's reasoning and analysis is wrong and should not be
followed.
The superior court, like the trial court in Sutton v. Leib, consid-
ered itself free to ignore the California decree of annulment. The
discussion hopelessly confuses jurisdiction and choice-of-law. After
stating the orthodox rule that the validity of the marriage is gov-
erned by the laws of state of celebration, the court concluded that
California lacked judicial jurisdiction to annul a marriage on
grounds proper by the law of the forum, when the marriage was
valid by the law of Mexico. Under Sutton v. Leib, it is clear that
California, as the state of the domicile (here both premarital and
postmarital) and with both parties personally before it, had judicial
jurisdiction. The fact that the court may have followed a wrong
67. 808 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954).
68. See also Nott v. Folsom, 161 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Landsman v.
Landsman, 302 N.Y. 45, 96 N.E.2d 81 (1950) (not a conflicts case).
69. 107 Pa. Super. 20, 162 Atl. 486 (1932).
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choice-of-law rule did not oust that jurisdiction or relieve Pennsyl-
vania from its obligation to give full faith and credit to the decree.
Curiously, the court quoted the rule that, as between states, the
application of the law of the forum when the law of some other
state should have been applied may be a violation of the full faith
and credit clause.70 This implies that the California court was act-
ing unconstitutionally in annulling the Mexican marriage. The
court failed to notice three reasons why this implication would be
incorrect. The full faith and credit clause does not apply as between
an American state and a foreign country. The quoted rule is of
limited application and does not apply when the forum is the
state of the dominant interest.7' Finally, even if the forum followed
an unconstitutional choice-of-law rule, its judgment would be bind-
ing unless reversed by appellate proceedings in the United States
Supreme Court.72
The interaction of state and federal law in this field is well
brought out in the social security cases. In Pearsall v. Folsonin a
widow who was entitled to mother's benefits lost them by remar-
riage but regained them when the second marriage was annulled for
fraud by a California court. The decree recited that the marriage
was "declared wholly null and void from the beginning," a phrase
appropriate to declaratory annulment, although fraud is usually a
ground for avoidance only and California law treats such mar-
riages as voidable. The federal court, applying California law, held
that the decree reached back and erased the marriage. It is true
that in California an ex-wife does not regain her right to alimony
when her second marriage is annulled7 4 but California applies Car-
dozo's idea that relation back is a fiction and will be applied only
when justice will be thereby promoted. An ex-husband will nor-
mally change his position in reliance on the remarriage of his di-
vorced wife, but no such change of position takes place in the social
security cases.
It should be noted that the federal court's application of state
law in this case is not required by the Erie doctrineh since the
70. See Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915). See also Overton, State
Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United States Supreme Court
Under the Due Process Clause, 22 OnE. L. REv. 109 (1943); Ross, Has the Con-
flict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MnqN. L. REv. 161 (1931).
71. The situations in which the rule is applied are discussed at length in Car-
roll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
72. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
73. 138 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, Folsom v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1957); accord, Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D. Vt. 1957);
Mays v. Folsom, 143 F. Supp. 784 (D. Idaho 1956). Nott v. Folsom, 161 F. Supp.
905 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), reached an opposite result applying New York law.
74. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 895, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
75. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). According to the Social Security
Act, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1952), determination
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widow's claim is based on a federal statute. The act itself calls for
the, application of state law to determine whether an applicant is
the widow of an insured individual. It does not require much
straining to extend this to the effect of a remarriage and later
annulment.
Another interesting case is Magner v. Folsom, 7 in which there
was no actual annulment but a collateral attack on a void marriage
in the social security proceeding. The Administrator, applying New
York conflicts rules, held that the marriage of two New York domi-
ciliaries, celebrated in Connecticut after each had secured a Mexi-
can mail-order divorce from a former spouse, was void and the
issue of the marriage, the claimant, was illegitimate. Under the
New York statute 77 the child of an annulled marriage is legitimate
if either parent was competent to marry and was ignorant of the
other's incompetency. This was not the case here, but the judge is
given discretion to declare the child legitimate in other cases. The
Administrator thought he could not exercise the discretion when
the marriage was collaterally attacked. The district court set him
right, ruling that he had the same powers which the New York
judge would have had in a direct annulment proceeding.
It should be remembered that the reference to local law in the
social legislation cases may require the application of the conflicts
rule of some state, usually that in which the federal court is sitting.
The rule is applied in Tatum v. Tatum,78 involving a widow's claim
to insurance under the Federal Employees' Group Insurance Act.
Decedent was covered by a policy and since he had designated no
beneficiary, the proceeds would go to his widow if he left one,
otherwise to his children. He had married the plaintiff in Arizona
five years before he was divorced from his first wife, mother of the
adverse claimants. This marriage was void, no matter what law we
apply, so plaintiff relied on a common-law marriage, also void by
the internal law of California. The court applied the California
conflicts rule which referred to the law of Texas, where the com-
mon-law marriage was allegedly contracted. Although Texas recog-
of family status, requires a reference to state law to determine whether applicant
is the widow of an insured individual, but the act does not mention tho effect of
remarriage. The court does not cite this clause in the Pearsall case but refers to
§ 402(g)(1)(F) as to the termination of the benefits on remarriage. In Nott v.
Folsom, 161 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and Magner v. Folsom, 153 F. Supp.
610 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the courts correctly relied on § 416(h). In Sparks v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D. Vt. 1957), the court ruled that the question was
controlled by federal law.
76. 153 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See comment on this case in RIEsENFELD
& MAxwEL, MODERN SociAL LEcxsL~rioN 127 & n. (Supp. OASDI 1958), citing
other Social Security cases.
77. N.Y. Cry. PnAc. AcT § 1135(6).
78. 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957).
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nizes such marriages, it has special rules applicable to nonresidents
and the marriage failed to meet the standards set by these rules.
An extreme application of res judicata is found in Headen v. Pope
& Talbot, Inc.,79 where the doctrine infused vitality into an imagi-
nary decree of annulment Plaintiff brought an action in a federal
court in Pennsylvania for the death of decedent, whom she had
married in Maryland when she was domiciled in Pennsylvania and
had a former husband living and undivorced. She relied on an
annulment of the earlier marriage by a South Carolina court in an
action brought by the former husband, but no such decree was on
record. Later on, this husband married again and brought a
declaratory judgment action (apparently against his second wife)
in which the court found that the annulment and remarriage were
valid. It was this judgment which was held to bar the present de-
fendant from attacking the alleged annulment.
Was this a sound application of the doctrine? Ordinarily, a de-
claratory judgment binds only the immediate parties. This is good
policy, since otherwise there is extreme danger of collusion. The
South Carolina statute, 0 differing from the Uniform Act,8 ' makes
the judgment conclusive "upon all persons concerned." The court
did not rely on the statute only but held that the action was in
rem and therefore conclusive on the whole world as to the exist-
ence of the marital status. It may be pointed out that the distinc-
tion made in Sutton v. Leib might properly have been applied.
Even though the declaratory judgment forever establishes the va-
lidity of the remarriage of Mrs. Headen's first husband, it did not
necessarily control the validity of her second marriage or the duties
of third persons arising out of the latter.
This case is also of interest in its adherence to the theory of the
state of paramount interest Pennsylvania law, not Maryland law,
governs the validity of the marriage celebrated in the latter state
when it has no other contact points. The court therefore applied the
Pennsylvania presumption of the validity of plaintiff's second mar-
riage, a presumption which greatly strengthened her otherwise
shaky case.
We can now regard it as established law that a decree of annul-
ment must be given full faith and credit in other states, and con-
elusively establishes the invalidity of the marriage as against all
persons who may assert its validity. The extent of the effect of res
judicata, especially as it operates as collateral estoppel and as it
bears on the rights and duties of third persons remains to be worked
out in the future. Sutton v. Leib gives us a good lead by holding
79. 252 F.2d 789 (Sd Cir. 1958).
80. S.C. CoDE § 20-42 (1952).
81. Unot DEoLARAToRY JUDG EmEns Acr § 11.
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that the forum may apply its own law to determine whether the
annulled marriage has produced certain legal consequences affect-
ing rights and duties of third persons. The extent to which this
may be done is not yet clear. The broad effect given to a declara-
tory judgment establishing the validity of a marriage cannot be
approved. However, the court in the Headen case correctly applied
Pennsylvania state law to determine whether the remarriage was
valid insofar as it affected defendant's duties.
VI. CHOICE OF LAw
In contrast to the uncertainty and conflict about jurisdiction,
there is at least surface agreement about the choice of law in an-
nulment proceedings. The courts uniformly apply, or purport to
apply, the law of the state where the marriage is celebrated, sub-
ject to certain well-known exceptions.s" This is merely a particular
application of the broad principle that a marriage good where it is
contracted is good everywhere, and the converse principle that a
marriage which is not good where contracted is not good any-
where.83 Since annulment is only allowed when the marriage is
void or voidable, its validity is the central issue in every such pro-
ceeding.
The validity of a marriage may be attacked directly by the
plaintiff in an annulment action or by the defendant in a declara-
tory judgment action. It may also be collaterally attacked in a
wide variety of other proceedings in which the rights of the parties
turn on the existence of the marriage. Cases of the latter type are
therefore in point as to the choice-of-law rule in annulment and
deserve some consideration in this article. However, no attempt
will be made to cover this field in detail. Our attention will be
chiefly focussed on the rule applied in actual annulment cases.
Why is there a difference between the choice-of-law rule in an-
nulment and in divorce? In the latter the courts apply the law of
the forum. 84 Perhaps it would sound better to say that they are
applying the law of the plaintiff's domicile, since this would nor-
mally coincide. When both parties are domiciled in the forum, the
interest of that state in the continuance of the marital relation far
out-weighs the interest of the state where they were married and
jusifies the application of the internal law of the former. Without
too much discussion, the courts have assumed that this is equally
true when only one of the spouses is domiciled in the forum.
82. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934); COODWCTI, CONFLICT O1
LAWS § 116 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 281 (2d ed. 1951).
83. CooDPicn, op. cit. supra note 82, § 116.
84. Torlonia v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 142 Atd. 843 (1928); RSTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 135 (1934).
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In annulment we are not asking whether a valid marriage should
be terminated but whether there ever was a valid marriage. It is
quite natural that the courts should look to the law of the state
of celebration for the answer to this question. It is highly probable
that the rule was originally based on the idea that marriage is a
contract, so that its validity, like that of all other contracts, should
depend on the lex loci contractus. This phrase is still used in the
English cases where American law is more apt to speak of the lex
celebrationis or its translation. The rule that contracts are governed
by the law of the place of making is not consistently followed as to
contracts made in one state and to be performed in another. Here
the English courts apply the "proper law" and it has been sug-
gested that they should do the same as to marriages contracted
in one state with an intent to establish the marital domicile else-
where.85
The standard exceptions to the orthodox rule relate to bigamous,
polygamous and incestuous marriages and those which violate the
public policy of the forum.8 " Of course, we could lump all of these
under a single exception, public policy, which is an implied ex-
ception to all choice-of-law rules. The first three exceptions, how-
ever, are considered important enough to justify separate state-
ment. Recent cases tend to emphasize the policy aspect and the
trend now is to recognize some of the incidents of such marriages
while denying recognition to the status itself.87
Cases of annulment of bigamous or polygamous marriages valid
by the law of the state of celebration are not easy to find. The sit-
uation most likely to arise was that occurring in Henzel v. Henzel,s
where plaintiff sought annulment of a marriage which she had
contracted in the mistaken belief that her husband had been legally
divorced from his former wife. On the surface, the court is apply-
ing the orthodox exception by refusing recognition to a marriage
bigamous by its law but valid by the law of the state of celebra-
tion. However, the forum could not have done this if the Nevada
divorce court had had jurisdiction. Not only the divorce decree,
but the single status of Mr. Henzel resulting from this decree, must
be recognized by all states under the full faith and credit clause.8 9
In one case of collateral attack, Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal
Corp.,)" the forum refused recognition to a bigamous marriage
85. Sykes, The Essential Validity of Marriage, 4 Nbr'L & Coxtn. L.Q. 159 (1955).
86. In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N.W. 428 (1927).
87. Estate of Bit, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948); see RzsTrmr.M-r
(SEcoND), Cou,_cr OF LAws § 134 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
88. A New York annulment proceeding which was not appealed. It is referred to in
Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1952).
89. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
90. 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 864 (1989).
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which was "valid until annulled" (in other words voidable) by the
law of the state of celebration, denying workmen's compensation
to a widow who had remarried in the mistaken belief that her first
husband was dead. It was argued by plaintiff that she was the
lawful widow of decedent by West Virginia law and it was now
too late for annulment proceedings, but the court countered with
the orthodox exception reinforced by the public policy doctrine.
In this case the marriage was bigamous by the law of both states,
and the result could be justified on the theory that the classifica-
tion of such a marriage as void or voidable is a matter of primary
characterization to be governed by the law of the forum.
The leading case involving the annulment of an incestuous mar-
riage valid by the law of the state of celebration is Garcia v. Gar-
cia.9 The court refused to annul the marriage of first cousins who
had married in California, their domicile at the time. This case can
be supported on the usual theory that the incest exception is limited
to relationships "deemed incestuous by the common consent of
Christendom" and this means only brother-sister marriages and mar-
riages in the direct line of ascent and descent.9 2 Thus circumscribed
the exception becomes meaningless, since in all probability these
marriages are not lawful anywhere in the world.13 There are con-
flicts cases of collateral attack on marriages not falling within the
narrow category: uncle and niece, cousins and persons closely re-
lated by affinity. The results are conflicting, depending on the
strength of the local policy against these unions . 4
Apart from the exceptions just discussed, refusal to apply the
law of the state of celebration is usually based on policy grounds.
Cunningham v. Cunningham is typical." A young girl was willing
to marry a middle-aged roomer living in her parents' home. New
York law forbade this96 so the couple crossed to New Jersey and per-
suaded a minister to marry them. The marriage was never con-
summated and the girl returned to her home after the ceremony.
Annulment was granted, the court stressing the right of every
state to determine the marital status of its residents and emphasiz-
ing the strength of the legislative policy. Actually, the marriage
91. 25 S.D. 645, 127 N.W. 586 (1910).
92. In re May's Estate, 805 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
93. Brother-sister marriages were contracted in the royal families of Burma and
Siam as late as the nineteenth century. A conflicts problem arose In Egypt after
the Roman occupation when certain Roman colonists married their sisters in ac-
cordance with Egyptian law. This was eventually forbidden by imperial edict.
94. Uncle-niece marriages were upheld in Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131,
98 Ad. 358 (1916), and In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
Contra, United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1901).
95. 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912).
96. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 7.
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may have been invalid under a New Jersey statute 7 which for-
bade persons authorized to perform the ceremony to do so when
the parties were under age. The statute did not in terms declare
the marriage void and a New Jersey court 8 had refused to annul
such a marriage after consummation. The New York court thought
the marriage was probably invalid and subject to annulment be-
fore consummation, but insisted on the application of New York
law in any event. In contrast to this case, there are holdings that
the forum will apply the law of the state of celebration even in
the case of its own domiciliaries. °9
The public policy exception has been resorted to in the mis-
cegenation cases.100 These holdings will probably soon run afoul
of the federal constitution, and the statutes themselves may meet
the same end.'0' In Naim v. NaiM,10 2 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia upheld an annulment of a marriage contracted in North
Carolina between a white woman, domiciled in Virginia, and a
Chinese man, when a Virginia statute prohibited such marriages.
In a brief memorandum opinion, the United States Supreme Court
ordered the judgment vacated but refused to pass on the con-
stitutionality of the statute because of the state of the record. 03
Study of the public policy cases raises some doubt as to the
accuracy of the orthodox rule. Are the courts really applying the
law of the state of celebration or the law of the domicile, which
often coincides with the former? Cases in which the courts refuse
to apply the law of the state of celebration usually involve strong
domiciliary contacts with the forum, and departure from the ortho-
dox rule is justified by the state's interest in the matrimonial status
of its citizens. At least three suggestions have been made as to
the rule which the courts ought to apply: the law of the state
having the paramount interest, 04 the proper law, 05 and the law
of the state of intended matrimonial domicile. 10 The first two
97. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (1952).
98. Wyckoff v. Boggs, 7 N.J.L. 138 (Super. Ct 1822).
99. Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2d 495 (1950); In re May's Estate,
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953); In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N.W.
428 (1927).
100. In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942); State v.
Bell, 7 Baxt. 9 (Tenn. 1872).
101. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
102. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), adhered to after remand to complete
record, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
103. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)
(memorandum decision), the Court refused to interfere after the Supreme Court
of Virginia reaffirmed its decision.
104. This phrase is explained in RE.sTATEmrr (SEcoND), CozFucr OF LAws
Topic 1, Introductory Note (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). See also id. § 132.
105. Sykes, supra note 85.
106. CooK, LoGIC Am I.mEAL BAsEs OF Tnm CoNFLmr OP L&ws (1942);
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are so nearly synonymous as to be considered differing phrases for
the same basic idea. The third suggestion, which is supported by
distinguished authors, is open to practical objections because of
difficulties of proving intent and the limited interest of any state in
parties who have not yet made their home there.107
A reasonable compromise is to retain the rule applying the law
of the state of celebration except in cases where this state has no
other contact, and where the domiciliary contacts with one other
state are strong enough to give the latter the paramount interest.
The rule should be flexible, leaving the court free to disregard
technical or short-lived domiciliary contacts and striking a rea-
sonable balance when the pre-marital and post-marital domiciles
differ. Such a rule explains cases like Cunningham v. Cunning-
ham 0 8 and Headen v. Pope & Talbot, Inc. 00 where the interest
of the state of domicile is clearly paramount. We can not, however,
eliminate the public policy limitation altogether. Cunningham v.
Cunningham can only be reconciled with In re May's Estate' on
the basis of a differing policy with respect to the two types of for-
bidden marriages.
Which rule should be applied by a forum which has no other
interest in the case when the state of celebration is not the state
of paramount interest? Departure from the orthodox rule is hardly
justified on the basis of public policy, but the rule suggested here
dictates the application of the law of the state of paramount in-
terest. This should include the conflicts rule of that state, which
means the introduction of renvoi.
This might very well explain the result in Meisenhelder v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry.,"' a fascinating case complicated by a federal
statute. Meisenhelder and Louise D'Albani, first cousins residing in
Illinois, married in Kentucky and returned to their home state,
where the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act made the union void.' 12
After the death of her husband on the job, Louise sued his em-
ployer in Minnesota under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 13
(A suit in Illinois would have been hopeless.) The statute gov-
erned as far as it went, but gaps would have to be filled by refer-
CHEsmRu, PRnVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (4th ed. 1952); Taintor, What Law
Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. REV. 353
(1939).
107. Sykes, supra note 85.
108. 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912).
109. 252 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1958).
110, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953). The domiciliary contacts in the
May case are not so strong as in Cunningham, but strong enough to make New
York's interest paramount.
111. 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32 (1927). See 26 Micn. L. REV. 827 (1928).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 19 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
113. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
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ence to state law. The court assumed this to be the conflicts rule
of the state of the tort, Illinois. The weight given to the Uniform
Act, which states a conflicts rule, makes it clear that the refer-
ence is not directly to the internal law of that state. If there were
no statute, the conflicts rule might have referred to the internal
law of the state of celebration, Kentucky, validating the marriage.
This would have been an instance of transmission renvoi
If the court had followed Morse's "guiding principle" that courts
favor widows de facto,"4 a holding for Louise would have been in
order and could easily be justified by a little juggling of the basic
analysis. Should not the reference from the federal statute be to
the conflicts rule of the forum?115 Then if Minnesota followed the
orthodox rule it might refer directly to the internal law of Ken-
tucky, short-circuiting Illinois and reaching a just result. This, how-
ever, would ignore the paramount interest of Illinois which the
court seems to sense, although it does not rationalize its holding
in this way.
VII. WHAT nIicE ANNULmNr?
Is annulment really necessary? Years ago Judge Goodrich sug-
gested dropping the idea of nullity altogether and substituting
divorce as a means of putting an end to imperfect marriages.110
This would do away with the rule of relation back and all its unde-
sirable consequences. The suggestion is worthy of serious consid-
eration, but so far the law does not seem to be taking this direc-
tion. It is true that statutes of many states permit divorces for
grounds existing at the time of the marriage,"1 thus blurring the
distinction between divorce and annulment On the other hand,
the idea of a sweeping abolition of annulment has not won any
substantial support."8
Certain practical difficulties may be noticed. Should the idea
extend to void as well as voidable marriages? If we retain the dis-
tinction between them and abolish annulment, we are taking a
step backward by making it impossible for a spouse to secure clari-
fication of an uncertain marital status. If we abolish the distinction
between void and voidable marriages and treat both as good
114. Morse, Characterization: Substance or Shadow, 49 COLVM. L. RE%. 1027
(1949).
115. In Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957), a federal court applied
the conflicts rule of the state in which it was sitting to fill a similar gap in another
federal statute.
116. Goodrich, Jurisdiction To Annul a Marriage, 32 H~Mv. L. lrLv. 806 (1919).
117. 2 SCHoULmr, MAB IGE, DivoncE, SEPARA noN AND DoMmrc REmA1O.s
§§ 1547-53 (6th ed. 1921).
118. A contrary position is taken in McMurray & Cunningham, Jurisdiction to
Pronounce Null a Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country, 18
CAL F. L. lv. 105 (1930).
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until one of the parties secures a divorce, are we not giving too
much recognition to bigamous marriages, at least in the light of
popular moral condemnation of such unions? Moreover, the sug-
gested change would run counter to the feelings of large groups
who oppose divorce on religious grounds. These feelings should
have weight with the legislatures, who would probably be disin-
clined to change a system which is working fairly well, and will
work much better if it is revised instead of being abolished.
If we are going to live with annulment for some time to come,
what can be done to improve this institution? There is too much
conflict, too much uncertainty, too much unjust operation in the
law as it stands. The only practicable way to change all this is
by legislation, and statutes are badly needed in nearly all states.
These statutes should not be drafted until a thorough study has
been made in the law of each state with a view to discovering its
defects, combined with an attempt to state the ideals that should
control the proposed legislation, and an appraisal of the possibility
of securing something approaching national uniformity in the law
in this field. Such a study should analyze the 1957 Colorado stat-
ute carefully, starting with this as a working model and exploring
the possibilities of improvement and adaptation to the policy of
other states. There should be no great difficulty in drafting new
statutes which will give us a greatly improved law of annulment.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggests the following conclusions.
1. The definition of annulment needs clarification. The difference
between the two kinds of annulments should be constantly borne
in mind, and short descriptive phrases should be introduced to
accentuate this difference. "Declaratory annulment" and "avoid-
ance annulment" are useful terms for this purpose.
2. Jurisdiction for annulment should be asserted and recognized
in the courts of the state of celebration and those of the state of
domicile of either husband or wife.
3. Constructive service should be allowed by order of court
when the defendant cannot be personally served within the forum.
If the whereabouts of the defendant is known or can be ascertained
with reasonable diligence, the court should direct service by regis-
tered mail or personal service outside the state. Service by pub-
lication should be permitted only after the court is convinced that
the defendant cannot be located.
4. A decree of annulment entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction has the effect of res judicata. Between American states
this is compelled by the full faith and credit clause. Under prin-
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ciples of conflict of laws, decrees of foreign courts should be given
equal effect
5. The extent of res judicata should be worked out along the
lines indicated in Sutton v. Leib. Since "marriage status" is not an
indivisible concept, a decree terminating the status or declaring
it nonexistent does not necessarily reinstate the exact situation
that would have existed if the parties had never gone through the
form of a marriage. Courts should have power to qualify decrees
of declaratory annulment so as to legitimize children, protect the
interests of third persons, and limit the effect of the decree on such
matters as custody and support.
6. The validity of the marriage should normally be governed
by the law of the state of celebration, except where the forum
has a strongly opposed public policy. The public policy exception
should be narrowly limited. When the state of celebration has no
other contact, the forum may properly apply the law of the state
having the paramount interest
7. Unsettled questions in this field should be worked out on
the basis of practical utilitarian considerations and not by deduc-
tive reasoning from a prior generalizations. Fictions should be dis-
carded. Annulment proceedings should be classified as sui generis,
and the method of service should not be controlled by analogies
drawn from contract or tort actions in personam or property actions
in rem.
8. In nearly all states there is need for legislation to modernize
and clarify the law of annulment. The Colorado statute is a con-
venient model but can be improved and adapted to the needs of
other states.
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